










Findings of the Signal Approach 









CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2774 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Findings of the Signal Approach 





This study concentrates on the signal approach for Kazakhstan. It focuses on the properties of 
individual indicators prior to observed currency crises. The indicators are used to build 
composite indicators. An advanced approach uses principal components analysis for the 
construction of composite indicators. Furthermore, the common signal approach is improved 
by robust statistical methods. The estimation period reaches from 1997 to 2007. It is shown 
that most of the composite indicators are able to flag the reported crises at an early stage. In a 
second step it is checked whether the most recent crisis in 2009 is signalled in advance. 
JEL Code: E32, E37, E59. 
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The Paper was produced in the context of an Early Warning Project conducted in 
collaboration with the National Analytical Centre of the Government and the National Bank 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan which has been supported by the German VW Foundation. 2 
Forecasting currency crises is a challenging task. A well-known standard approach is 
the signal approach developed by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR).
1 Following 
this approach currency crises are identified by means of a foreign exchange market 
pressure index. This pressure index serves as a reference series for dating currency cri-
ses. In a second step KLR propose the monitoring of macroeconomic variables (single 
indicators) that may tend to show unusual behaviour in periods (one or two years) prior 
to currency turbulences. An indicator sends a crisis warning signal whenever it moves 
beyond a given critical threshold. Moreover, composite indicators can be constructed 
that encompass the signalling behaviour of the selected individual indicators. Finally, 
crises probabilities can be estimated. This procedure, which can be performed for each 
single country with reported currency crises, characterizes the signal approach.  
 
From the statistical point of view the signal approach can be characterized as a non-
parametric approach, since it does not require the assumption of a specific model (in 
contrast to logit models or Markov regime-switching models). Indeed the parametric 
models may be more efficient, when the models assumptions hold in reality. The signal 
approach on the other hand should be a quite versatile method. It should be especially 
advantageous when data quality is quite unsure and/or when dependencies between 
macroeconomic variables might not be stable. Dependencies could be time varying in 
developed countries, but this problem should be of especial importance in developing 
countries like Kazakhstan. In such cases the signal approach will be a rather robust 
method for monitoring currency crises. So, even when there are model based ap-
proaches working well within available samples, the signal approach has its own justifi-
cation because it is a nonparametric method. In this study the signal approach is refined 
by outlier robust estimation methods, which further enhances the usefulness of the sig-
nal approach.  
The following empirical study concentrates on the signal approach for Kazakhstan. It 
focuses on the signalling properties of several individual macroeconomic indicators 
prior to episodes of foreign exchange market turbulences in Kazakhstan, as indicated by 
                                            
1   See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998),  3 
the exchange market pressure index. The individual indicators are used to build com-
posite currency crises indicators by exploiting the signal behaviour of each individual 
indicator. A more advanced approach uses principal components analysis of the indi-
vidual indicators to construct composite indicators. The estimation period of the critical 
thresholds reaches from January 1997 to December 2007. For this time span it is shown 
that most of the composite indicators are able to flag the two reported currency crises in 
this time span at an early stage (in-sample analysis). In a second step it is checked 
whether the most recent crisis in February 2009 is signalled by the composite indicators 
in advance (out-of-sample analysis). In an annex, the model based parametric Markov 
regime-switching approach is briefly discussed
1. All data was taken from the Agency of 
Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS), published by the International Monetary Fond. 
 
An important requirement for an early-warning system to function properly is timeli-
ness. For this reason this study is based on monthly data or on quarterly data, which has 
been transformed into monthly data by means of temporal disaggregation techniques. 
                                            
1   The econometric appoach can be also based on panel data of a group of countries with observed cur-
rency crises. The disadvantage of the panel approach is that country specifics might be neglected (e.g. 
for the case of Kazakhstan the predominant importance of oil prices). See Knedlik, Scheufele (2007). 
Berg, Pattillo (1999), Abiad (2003).      4 
1 The Signal Approach  
1.1 Defining Currency Turbulences  
 
Following the signal approach, currency turbulences should be defined using definite 
criteria. Currency crises are identified by means of a foreign exchange market pressure 
index relying on the known symptoms of such episodes of currency turbulences:
1 
 
•  a sudden and sharp devaluation of a currency, 
•  a substantial decrease in foreign exchange reserves  
 
It is quite important to focus on both aspects, because currency crises can break out that 
leads to a sharp devaluation of a currency. But sometimes monetary institutions try to 
avoid these devaluations. They intervene to avoid or soften the devaluation. Although 
no sharp devaluation occurred in these cases, they are also currency crises because the 
authorities were forced to intervene. Such hidden or sometimes avoided crises are visi-
ble in the foreign exchange reserves because they are used to intervene. For a method, 
that is used to give early warnings on currency crises it is important that visible and 
hidden or avoided crises are included in the calculations. Hence an index of pressure in 
the foreign exchange market IPt at month t is constructed by using the monthly rates of 
change of the foreign exchange reserves and the real exchange rate. 
 
IPt = γ1 Δwrt  - γ2 Δrert   
 
Δwrt is the monthly rate of change of the foreign exchange reserves; Δrert is the monthly 
rate of change of the real exchange rate, which is given by the nominal exchange rate of 
the Tenge to the USD, adjusted for the trends in consumer prices in the United States 
and in Kazakhstan.
2 A rise in the real exchange rate corresponds to a real depreciation 
                                            
1   See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart. (1998), Schnatz (1998, 1999a, 1999b), Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1999) and Nierhaus (2000). 
2   The real exchange rate rert is given by rert = erCURRENCY|US$,t• CPIUS,t /CPIt. It follows that Δrer,t ≈ Δer-
CURRENCY|US$,t + ΔCPIUS,t - ΔCPIt. A real depreciation of the currency follows from a nominal deprecia-
tion of the currency and/or a rise in US consumer prices and/or a decline in domestic consumer prices. 5 
of the currency. Since the variances of Δrer,t and Δwrt are different, they are weighted 
(γ1 and γ2) by using the standard deviation of the variables.
1 The real exchange rate is 




Tensions in the foreign exchange market are identified for periods when the foreign 
exchange market index swings deeply into the negative. In the present study, for a cur-
rency turbulence, the pressure index IPt must exceed its mean μ more than 3 times the 
standard deviation σ = √varIPt.
3 The parameters μ and σ are unknown theoretical val-
ues, depending on the underlying distribution of IPt. 
 
Definition: month t with crisis event <=> IPt < μ - 3σ 
 
From that point, a window of three quarters is drawn. If a new event occurs in this area, 
then the time in-between is defined as a crisis episode. Otherwise the last point in time 
of the event is fixed as the end of the episode. 
 
In a normal distribution the probability for an observation smaller than μ - 3σ  would be 
about 0.135%. So currency crises are very rare events, as they should be. Calculating 
respective probabilities from a distribution with heavy tails or an asymmetric distribu-
tion would indeed lead to larger values.   
                                            
1   γ1 = √var(Δrer,t)/[√var(Δwrt) + √var(Δrert)], γ2 = √var(Δwrt)/[√var(Δwrt) + √var(Δrert)].  
2   See Schnatz (1999b). 
3    See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart. (1998), p. 16. 6 
The true σ is unknown and must be estimated from data at hand.
1 Since the analysis of 
currency crises means searching for extreme events in time series, the question arises as 
to how to measure scale. Empirical variance and empirical standard deviation are esti-
mators, which are very sensitive against outliers. Data used for the analysis of currency 
crises contain extreme events or outliers, therefore robust estimation methods might be 
preferable. With non-robust estimators, outliers could mask themselves. One robust 
measure of scale is the median of absolute deviations from the median (MAD).  This 
robust scale estimator is used in the study at hand. The MAD is adjusted by a factor for 
asymptotically normal consistency. It holds 
 
E 1.4826• MAD X1,X2,X3,... ( ) [] =σ 
 
for  X j, j =1,2,3,...,n, distributed as N(μ,σ
2) and large n. 
 
1.2 Selecting Indicators 
 
The signal approach uses indicators to detect currency crises in advance. Since currency 
crises are extreme events, they usually are preceded by extreme developments or imbal-
ances. So they might be detected by leading indicators, showing exceptional values be-
fore the crises starts. With this conception in mind it is obvious to condense the infor-
mation contained in leading indicators to a binary variable, which differentiates whether 
the indicator is in a normal or in a extreme range. This is an important feature of the 
signal approach. The indicators are transformed to binary variables and are not used in 
there original form 
   
From the statistical point of view the signal approach can be characterized as a non-
parametric approach, since it does not require the assumption of a specific model (in 
contrast to logit models or Markov-switching models). Indeed the parametric models 
                                            
1    Also unknown in μ, which is estimated by the arithmetic mean m of IPt. 7 
may be more efficient when the models assumptions hold in reality. The signal ap-
proach on the other hand should be a quite versatile method. 
 
The signal approach proposes the monitoring of a quantity of macroeconomic variables 
(indicators) that may tend to show unusual patterns in periods prior to currency turbu-
lences. Under the signal approach, a reasonable crises indicator should be systemati-
cally higher (or lower) prior to currency turbulences than in tranquil periods. Formally, 
an indicator is said to issue a warning signal if it exceeds (is below) a critical threshold 
level. This level has to be chosen appropriately to balance the risks of having numerous 
false signals and the risk of not registering crises.
1 For all calculations a 12-month crisis 
window is used. 
 
To fix ideas, let St be a binary signal variable, depending on the value of the individual 
indicator Vt at time t, the critical cutoff value δ and the expected sign (+/-) before crises: 
                                            
             1    if  Vt  > δ                              1    if  Vt  < δ            
S
+
t =                                      or S
−
t =                                       
             0    if  Vt ≤ δ                               0    if  Vt ≥ δ  
 
In this concept the informative content of an observation at time t is reduced to one of 
two possibilities: either the indicator exceeds (is below) the threshold δ and gives a cri-
sis warning signal (St = 1), or it is below (exceeds) the threshold sending no signal 
(St = 0). However, there may be correct signals and false signals. An indicator sends a 
correct signal if   
 
•  St = 1 and a crisis happens within 12 months  
•  St = 0 and no crisis happens within 12 months.  
 
                                            
1   See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998). 8 
In the first case the indicator sends a signal and is followed within 12 months by a cur-
rency crisis. In the second case the indicator does not send a signal and is not followed 
by a crisis. By contrast, the indicator issues a false signal if  
 
•  St = 1 and no crisis happens within 12 months  
•  St = 0 and a crisis happens within 12 months. 
 
In the third case the indicator sends a signal and is not followed by a crisis. In the last 
case the indicator does not send a signal and is followed by currency turbulence. Alto-




Classification Table  Crisis within 
12 months  
No crisis within 
12 months 
Total 
Signal is sent: St = 1  A (= number of signals) B (= number of signals)  A+B 
No signal is sent: St = 0  C (= number of signals) D (= number of signals)  C+D 
Total   A+ C  B+D   A+B+C+D 
Correct   A   D  A+D 
Correct as % of total  A/(A+C) D/(B+D)  (A+D)/(A+B+C+D) 
Incorrect as % of total  C/(A+C) B/(B+D)    (B+C)/(A+B+C+D) 
 
 
Following KLR, a perfect indicator would only produce signals that belong to the north-
west and south-east cells of the inner matrix (see shadowed area). It would issue a sig-
nal in every month that is followed by a crisis (A > 0), so that the number of missing 
warning signals C equals zero, and it would not send a signal in every month that is not 
followed by a crisis (D > 0), so that the number of wrong warning signals B equals zero.  
 
On the basis of this concept, the overall performance of an indicator Vt (that is the abil-
ity to issue correct signals and to avoid false signals) can be measured by the (adjusted) 
noise-to-signal ratio ω. This figure is defined as the ratio of9 
 
•  the number of false warning signals (= noise) divided by the number of observations 
in tranquil periods B/(B+D) and 
•  the number of correct warning signals divided by the number observations in the 
run-up period A/(A+C).  
 
Indicators with ω > 1 are excluded from the analysis. Following KLR,
1 another way of 
interpreting the results of noisiness of the indicators is by comparing the probability of a 
crisis conditional on a warning signal from the indicator P(Crisis | warning signal) = 
A/(A+B) with the unconditional probability of a crisis P(Crisis) = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D). 
If the indicator has useful information, then the conditional probability of a crisis should 
be higher than the unconditional one.  
 
Another measure for the quality of an indicator Vt is the odds ratio ζ. The odds ratio 
describes the strength of association between two binary data values. The odds for a 
currency crisis within 12 months (or not), given a signal St (that is warning signal or 
not) can be defined in terms of conditional probabilities (Table 2). The odds for a crisis 
conditional on a warning signal is [A/(A+B)]/[B/(A+B)] =A/B. The odds for a crisis 
conditional on a missing warning signal is C/(C+D)]/[D/(C+D)= C/D. Then the odds 
ratio ζ is defined as 
 
ζ = (A/B)/(C/D) = (A●D)/(B●C)  
 
An odds ratio of 1 indicates that the event of a currency crisis is equally likely if we 
observe a crisis warning signal or not. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that the 
crisis is more likely if the indicator has sent a warning signal. And an odds ratio less 
than 1 indicates that the crisis is even less likely if the indicator has sent a warning sig-
nal. Obviously, reasonable indicators have odds ratios greater than 1.
2 
                                            
1   See Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998). 
2   However, odds-ratios are not symmetric with respect to the ordering of variables. The logarithm of the 
odds ratio, the difference of the logits of the probabilities, makes the measure symmetric. 10 
 
Table 2 
Conditional Crisis Probabilities 
  Crisis within 
12 months  
No crisis within 
12 months  
Signal is sent: St = 1  A/(A+B)  B/(A+B) 
No signal is sent: St = 0  C/(C+D)  D/(C+D) 
               
 
Finally, in order to discriminate between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour of an indi-
vidual indicator, the threshold δ has to be defined. If the cutoff value is set at a rather 
high level, the indicator is likely to miss all but the most severe crises. In contrast, if the 
threshold is set very low, the indicator is likely to catch all crises but is also likely to 
send many false warning signals in tranquil periods. A commonly used way is to set the 
cut-off value δ in relation to α-percentiles of the distribution of indicator observations, 
that is δ = F
-1(α). For example, a possible threshold for the rate of growth of exports 
would be the set of rates of growth that would leave 75 % of the observations above the 
cut-off value. This set of growth rates is determined by the first quartile of the fre-
quency distribution (i.e. the 25 % percentile).  
 
A more sophisticated approach is to choose a specific percentile of the frequency distri-
bution. The threshold value can be derived by taking the distribution of the predicted 
values and the number of turbulences for each country into account. The α-percentile 
might be calculated as the maximum possible number of correct signals prior to cur-
rency crisis (here generally 12) in relation to the total number of available observations. 
Subtracting this value from 1 puts the threshold in the area of the frequency distribution 
with the high values:
1  
              
α = 1 - (Max possible no. of alarms / Total no. of observations) 
                
                                            
1   See Schnatz, (1999a). 11 
For indicators with an expected sign (-) the expression has to be modified: 
 
α = (Max possible no. of alarms / Total no. of observations) 
 
In this case the threshold is put in the area of the distribution with low values.
1 
 
1.3 Composite Indicators 
 
Based on the assumption that the greater the number of leading indicators signalling a 
crisis, the higher the probability that such a crisis would actually occur, KLR proposed 
a number of composite leading indices. Composite indicators are constructed by weight-
ing together the signals Sr,,t  of k individual indicators Vr,t.
2 
 
St = ∑ r=1,...,k Sr,,t wr  and  ∑ r=1,…,k wr = 1. 
 
Similar to individual crises indicators, the composite indicator gives a warning signal if 
it exceeds a critical value δS. Once again, the threshold δS is defined in relation to per-
centiles of the frequency distribution of observations. The percentile is calculated as the 
maximum possible number of correct signals prior to a currency crisis as a percentage 
of the total number of available observations. Subtracting this value from 1 puts the 
threshold in the area of the distribution with high values. 
 
Obviously there are two rules for determining the weights of the specific indicator sig-
nals. One approach focuses on equal weights; the other would exploit the observed 
forecasting performance of the individual indicators before past crises. The latter ap-
proach is clearly favourable if future crises are driven by the same economic factors as 
the past crises, whereas the equal weight approach is neutral. 
                                            
1   Another specific approach, proposed by KLR, suggests that a grid of reference percentiles (for exam-
ple percentiles between 10 and 20 percent) should be defined for each individual indicator. Then an 
‘optimal’ rank is found by determining the critical cutoff value (associated with the pre-selected grid) 
that minimizes the adjusted noise-to-signal ratio 
2   See Kaminsky (1998) for a detailed discussion of combining individual indicators. 12 
 
1.4 Calculating Crisis Probabilities 
 
While composite currency crises indicators show changes in the strength or weakness of 
crisis warning signals, the index levels cannot be directly interpreted. However, it is 
possible to assign a particular estimated crisis probability to any value of a composite 
crisis indicator by dividing the entire sample into several groups, each corresponding to 
a particular range of the composite indicator, and calculating the proportion of months 
associated with crises for each group, using the formula  
 
 
                                  Number of months with a < St < b and a crisis following within 12 months   
P(crisis | a<St<b)  =  ────────────────────────────────────────── 
                                                       Number of months with a < St < b  
 
 
where St is the value of the composite indicator at time t, a is the lower bound of a par-
ticular range of the index, b is the upper bound of the range, and P(crisis | a< St< b) is 
the estimated probability of a crisis occurring within 12 months conditional on St lying 
in the range between the lower and upper bounds a and b.
1 In the present study, the en-
tire sample was divided, ranked by the value of the composite indicator, into five 
groups. The groups are classified in intervals as follows: 0, 0-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-100. 
The estimated probabilities are non-linear transformations of the indicators. 
 
2. Results for Kazakhstan 
2.1 Observed Currency Crises  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the conduct of the exchange market pressure index for Kazakhstan. 
As said before, tensions in the foreign exchange market are identified for periods when 
the pressure index swings sharply into the negative. For dating a currency crisis, the 
pressure index IPt must exceed its mean 3 times the adjusted MAD (see dotted line).  
 
                                            
1   See Zhuang, Dowling (2002) and  Knedlik, Scheufele (2007). 13 
Figure 1 





































































































Following these rules, three crisis periods were detected for Kazakhstan (shaded areas). 
The most prominent observation is the 1998/99 turbulence. The exchange rate devalued 
from 79.4 Tenge per USD (September 1998) to 130.4 Tenge per USD (June 1999), and 
the currency reserves dropped in September 1998 by 12.8 % and in March 1999 by 
15.4 %. In August 2007 the Banking Crisis took place, accompanied by a remarkable 
decrease in foreign exchange reserves (Table 3). In February 2009, the National Bank 
of Kazakhstan defined a new level of exchange rate of the national currency, 150 Tenge 
per USD ±3% or ±5 Tenge (before: band within 117-123 Tenge per USD or 120 Tenge 
±2%). Starting from the fourth quarter of 2008 until February, the NBK spent USD 6 




                                            
1   See National Bank of Kazakhstan, press release No. 3, February 4, 2009. 14 
Table 3 






Sep. 1998 – June 1999     ·  Exchange rate of the Tenge was devalued from 79.4 (Sept 1998) to 130.4 
(June 1999) (-40 %). 
·  Foreign exchange reserves dropped by 12.8 % (Sept. 1998) and 15.4 % 
(March 1999) respectively. 
August 2007   ·  Foreign exchange reserves dropped by 15.3 %.  




2.2 Identifying Individual Indicators for Kazakhstan 
 
The signal approach proposes the monitoring of a quantity of macroeconomic variables 
(single indicators) that may tend to show unusual patterns in periods prior to currency 
turbulences. The following list of individual indicators
1 with noise-to-signal ratios be-
low unity
2 displayed a conspicuous behaviour in the year prior to currency turbulences 
in Kazakhstan, and will be used in this study for that reason. 
 
−  Deviation of the real exchange rate from its least absolute deviations trend (LAD 
trend). A negative value indicates an overvaluation. A multi-country comparison of 
real exchange rates shows that currencies often tend to be overvalued prior to specu-
lative attacks. The LAD trend minimizes the sum of absolute values of deviations 
(errors) from the trend line. The least absolute deviations trend is robust in that it is 
resistant to outliers in the data.  
 
−  Export growth. The overvaluation of a currency should have repercussions on trade 
flows. Export growth often declines in the run-up to currency crises, including the 
                                            
1   For a detailed discussion see Schnatz (1998) and Ahec-Šonje and Babić (2003). 
2   Individual indicators with noise-to-signal ratios of above one were excluded from the analyses. 15 
 period prior to the outbreak of the crises. 
 
−  Balance on current account as a share of GDP. Current account deficits (as a per-
centage of GDP) were typically higher prior to speculative attacks than in tranquil 
periods. Not only the loss of international competitiveness, which should show up al-
ready in a deterioration of the trade account, but also the funds necessary to service 
international debts, which is reflected in the current account position, may have been 
important for assessing a country’s vulnerability to speculative attacks.  
 
−  Growth of domestic credit as a share of GDP. The growth of domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP could indicate that a country is conducting an excessively expan-
sionary economic policy. Moreover, a large level of domestic credit growth could 
also indicate excessive lending financed by an exchange-rate-orientated monetary 
policy. 
 
−  Change of oil price (Brent). Energy (production of crude oil and natural gas) is the leading 
economic sector in Kazakhstan. 
 
−  Real interest rate. An increase of real interest rates could mean shrinking liquidity in the 
financial system of a country. 
 
−  Growth of real GDP. The overvaluation of a currency should dampen economic activity. 
 
−  Money Supply. An increase in M1 means that the monetary policy is expansionary, causing 
pressure for the domestic currency. 
 
−  Lending/deposit interest rates differential. A widening lending to deposit rate differential can 
signal a risk increase and deterioration of bank portfolios, as well as lack of competition and 
supervisory and regulatory weaknesses. 
 
−  External debt as a share of GDP. A growing external dept to GDP ratio often signals an 
increasing external vulnerability. 16 
The ten individual indicators for Kazakhstan were analysed according to the methods of 
KLR. The results are summarised in Table 4. Thresholds were calculated for the time 
span January 1997 to December 2007. Table 4 also shows the expected sign (+ high 




Performance of Individual Currency Crises Indicators
Expected  Good signals Bad signals Adjusted Odds- P(Crisis | P(Crisis |
sign as percentage as percentage noise-to- Ratio signal) signal)
before of possible of possible signal-ratio   - P(crises)
crises good signals bad signals      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
In terms of the classification table 2   A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)]/ (A*D)/(B*C) A/(A+B) A/(A+B) -
[A/(A+C)] (A+C)/(A+B+C+D)
Real exchange rate (dev. from LAD trend) - 0.50 0.12 0.25 7.08 0.50 0.30
Export - 0.33 0.16 0.49 2.53 0.33 0.13
CAB/GDP - 0.42 0.14 0.35 4.23 0.42 0.22
Credits to economy/GDP + 0.63 0.09 0.15 16.30 0.63 0.43
External debt/GDP + 0.38 0.15 0.41 3.28 0.38 0.18
Oil price (Brent) - 0.54 0.11 0.21 9.24 0.54 0.34
Real  GDP - 0.33 0.16 0.49 2.53 0.33 0.13
Lending /deposit interest rates differencial + 0.38 0.16 0.44 3.04 0.36 0.16
Money supply + 0.38 0.15 0.41 3.28 0.38 0.18




3 Conduct of Composite Indicators  
3.1. Signal Approach 
 
As composite leading indices contain more information and are in general more reliable 
than single indicators, they are used for predicting crises. The first approach focuses on 
the traditional signal method. Under the signal approach, composite indicators are con-
structed by weighting together the signals of individual indicators. Indicator S1 gives 
equal weights (=1/10) to all individual signal variables Sr  
 
S1t = ∑ r=1,...,10 Sr,t 1/10 
 
In any month, we can observe between zero and ten warning signals, so 0 ≥ S1t ≤ 1. 17 
A second indicator uses the information on the forecasting accuracy of each single indi-
cator Sr by exploiting the specific noise-to-signal ratios ωr = [Br/(Br+Dr)]/[Ar/(Ar+Cr)]: 
 
S2t = ∑ r=1,...,10 Sr,t [(1/ωr)/∑ r=1,...,10 1/ωr]  
 
Here the signals of the individual indicators are weighted by the inverse of their ad-
justed noise-to-signal ratios, which were divided by the sum of the inverse noise-to-
signal ratios to add up to unity. Composite indicator 2 gives more weight to the signal-
ling behaviour of individual indicators with low noise-to-signal ratios.  
 
Composite indicator 3 uses the information coming from the specific odds-ratios 
ζr = (Ar●Dr)/(Br●Cr) of the single indicators Sr: 
 
 S3t = ∑ r=1,...,10 Sr,t ●[ζ r / ∑ r=1,...,10 ζ r] 
 
This indicator gives more weight to the signalling behaviour of individual indicators 
with high odds-ratios. 
 
Figures 2a-2c shows the conduct of the three composite indicators in Kazakhstan. Cri-
ses periods are represented by shaded areas. The dotted line shows the specific indicator 
thresholds δS. The composite indicators send a warning signal whenever they move 
above the critical value. As said before, the estimation period for the critical thresholds 
reaches from January 1997 to December 2007, thus allowing an out-of-sample test with 
the most recent crisis in Kazakhstan, which happened in February 2009. In addition, the 
estimated crises probabilities are shown in figures 3a-3c. Here the dotted lines mark the 






3.2 Mixed approach: Principal Components and Single Indicators  
 
A larger number of indicators can be firstly condensed with the help of principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA).
1 PCA involves a mathematical procedure that transforms a 
number of possibly correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables 
called principal components. The first principal component accounts for as much vari-
ability (measured by variance) in the data as possible. Each succeeding component ac-
counts for as much of the remaining variability as possible, under the constraint that 
every principal component is uncorrelated with the preceding ones. Mathematically, 
PCA leads to a eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance or, as in this analysis of the 
correlation matrix of the leading indicators. The eigenvectors give the weighting 
scheme of the indicators, and the corresponding eigenvalues are equal to the variance, 
explained by the corresponding principal component. From the eigenvalue decomposi-
tion as many eigenvectors as indicators results. To condense the information contained 
in the whole indicator set, only a few principal components are extracted and used in the 
signal approach. So the question is how many components are needed to provide an 
adequate summary of a given data set? Here a relative ad hoc procedure is used. Only 
principal components with eigenvalues greater than one are chosen. This simple proce-
dure is called Kaiser criterion. In a second step the components are examined for plau-
sibility. 
    
Here a mixed approach is pursued. On the one hand two predominant individual indica-
tors, namely the real exchange rate (deviation from LAD trend)
2 and the change of oil 
price, are used as input for the composite indicator; on the other hand the principal 
components with eigenvalues greater than one of the remaining eight indicators. For the 
identification of the “expected sign” of the principal components before currency crises, 
a cross-correlation analysis with the pressure index for the time-span January 1997 to 
                                            
1    See Jolliffe I.T. (2002). 
2   A multi-country comparison of real exchange rates shows that currencies often tend to be overvalued 
prior to speculative attacks.  21 
December 2000 was carried out. The inverse direction of the observed largest cross-
correlation was taken for the expected sign of the principal component.  
Indicator S4 gives equal weights to the warning signals of the five individual input se-
ries. Indicator S5 uses the information on the forecasting accuracy of each input series 
by exploiting the specific noise-to-signal ratios. Once again the warning signals are 
weighted by the inverse of their adjusted noise-to-signal ratios. Finally indicator S6 uses 
the odd-ratios of the input series as a weighting scheme. Figures 4a-4c present the com-
posite indicators, figures 5a-5c the estimated crises probabilities. 
 
Obviously, there is no unambiguous composite indicator that shows best results for Ka-
zakhstan (see table 5). This finding is not very astonishing, taking into account that all 
time-series are relatively short and that there are only two observed currency turbu-
lences in the in-sample-period 1997 to 2007. However, the noise-to-signal ratios of all 
composite crises indicators are well below unity. Consequently, all indicators exhibit 
useful information (see columns five to seven in table 5). The estimated conditional 
probability for a currency crisis P(Crisis | signal) is in all cases higher than the uncondi-
tional probability for a crisis. Furthermore, the odds ratios are clearly above one. An 
odds ratio greater than one indicates, that a crisis is more likely if the indicator has sent 
a warning signal. 
 
Table 5 
Performance of Composite Currency Crises Indicators
In-sample Out-of-sample Good signals Bad signals Adjusted Odds- P(Crisis | P(Crisis |
Percentage Percentage as percentage as percentage noise-to- Ratio signal) signal)
of crises of crises of possible of possible signal-ratio   - P(crises)
signalled signalled good signals bad signals      
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)]/ (A*D)/(B*C) A/(A+B) A/(A+B)-
[A/(A+C)] (A+C)/(A+B+C+D)
Signal Approach
Composite Indicator (1) 50 0 0.46 0.05 0.11 15.57 0.69 0.49
Composite Indicator (2) 100 0 0.67 0.08 0.12 22.25 0.67 0.47
Composite Indicator (3) 100 0 0.67 0.07 0.11 25.71 0.70 0.50
Mixed Approach
Composite Indicator (4) 50 0 0.29 0.03 0.11 12.90 0.70 0.50
Composite Indicator (5) 100 100 0.54 0.08 0.15 13.15 0.62 0.42
Composite Indicator (6) 100 100 0.54 0.05 0.10 21.75 0.72 0.52







Indicator 1 as well as indicator 4 miss the 2007 crisis, the remaining four indicators sig-
nal all crises in the in-sample-period 1997 to 2007. Concerning the out-of-sample-crisis 
2009, only indicators 5 and 6 from the mixed approach gave correct warning signals in 
the preceding year 2008. Finally, indicators 2 and 3 as well as indicators 5 and 6 
showed some false alarms in 2001/2002.        
 
Annex  
Annotation: Model Based Approaches 
 
For the analysis of currency crises besides the signal approach also model based para-
metric methods are applied in the literature. These approaches include nonlinear regres-
sion models like logit regressions. Another model based approach is Markov regime-
switching (MRS). This is briefly discussed in the sequel. 
     
In modern statistics, non-linear time series methods are increasingly being used for the 
modeling of structural breaks and regime-dependent dynamics. Markov regime-
switching models are prominent examples in which the model parameters depend on 
stochastic regime variables. With this approach a model that is in itself linear becomes 
more flexible because the parameters can take on different values, depending on the 
regime in which the time series is found. In this way in the modeling process it can be 
taken into consideration that the dynamics vary over time. Since the time points of the 
regime change do not need to be provided in advance but can be estimated during the 
calculations, this model type can also be used for the dating of currency crises.  
 
Concretely, the foreign exchange market index IPt is assumed to depend on a non-
observable status variable st, which is designated as the status or regime at point-of-
time t. The number of cyclical regimes in this study is limited to two. For st = 1, status 1 
(crisis period) applies; for st = 2, status 2 applies (tranquil period). The probability with 
which the regime changes from one period to the other period (or remains in one) is 
assumed to be time-invariant and depends only on the state of the previous period st-1 
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p(st = i | st-1= j) = pij;   i, j = 1,2  
 
With a Markov process with two states, there are a total of four transition probabilities. 
For these p1 + p12 = p22 + p21 =1 applies; the status variable st thus follows a Markov 
process of the first degree. The distribution of IPt (with a given state of i) is described 
by the density function f 
 
f(IPt | st = i, μi, ß, σ
2) = 1/(2π σ
2)




i.e., IPt is normally distributed with a state-dependent mean value μi + Ztß and constant 
variance σ
2. Zt is a vector of indicators at time t and ß is a vector of non-switching re-
gression parameters. For state 1, μ1 applies, otherwise μ2. The vector of parameters to be 
estimated (p11, p22, μ1, μ2, ß, σ
2) of the MS model is designated with the symbol θ.
1 The 
MRS model can be estimated with the maximum-likelihood method, in which in the 
calculation practice numeric optimisation methods are employed due to non-linearities.
2 
 
At the same time, the procedure supplies, in addition to estimations of the parameter 
vector θ, also a quantification of regime probabilities depending on amount the of in-
formation considered in each case: The probability p(st = i | IT) designates the condi-
tional probability of being at point t in regime i, in the case that the entire amount of 
information is conditioned (smoothed probability) in estimation period [1,…,T] of the 
MRS model. The probability p(st = i | It), on the other hand, describes the conditional 
probability for state i, in the case that the focus is only on the amount of information 
available up to the calculating period t (filtered probability). For the final point-of-time 
T, the filtered value corresponds to the smoothed value. Both regime probabilities may 
serve as composite currency crisis indicators. 
 
                                            
1  The probability p12 , which is also unknown and to be estimated, follows from the relationship 1 - p11; 
the probability p21 from 1 - p22. 
2   For a time-varying specification of transition probabilities pij and variance σ
2,
 see Abiad (2003) and 
Knedlik, Scheufele (2007). 26 
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